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During infectious disease epidemics, an important question is whether cases travelling to new 26 
locations will trigger local outbreaks. The risk of this occurring depends on the transmissibility of 27 
the pathogen, the susceptibility of the host population and, crucially, the effectiveness of 28 
surveillance in detecting cases and preventing onward spread. For many pathogens, transmission 29 
from presymptomatic and/or asymptomatic (together referred to as nonsymptomatic) infectious 30 
hosts can occur, making effective surveillance challenging. Here, using SARS-CoV-2 as a case-31 
study, we show how the risk of local outbreaks can be assessed when nonsymptomatic 32 
transmission can occur. We construct a branching process model that includes nonsymptomatic 33 
transmission, and explore the effects of interventions targeting nonsymptomatic or symptomatic 34 
hosts when surveillance resources are limited. We consider whether the greatest reductions in local 35 
outbreak risks are achieved by increasing surveillance and control targeting nonsymptomatic or 36 
symptomatic cases, or a combination of both. We find that seeking to increase surveillance of 37 
symptomatic hosts alone is typically not the optimal strategy for reducing outbreak risks. Adopting 38 
a strategy that combines an enhancement of surveillance of symptomatic cases with efforts to find 39 
and isolate nonsymptomatic infected hosts leads to the largest reduction in the probability that 40 
imported cases will initiate a local outbreak. 41 
 42 
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1. Introduction 47 
 3 
Emerging epidemics represent a substantial challenge to human health worldwide [1-4]. When 48 
cases are clustered in specific locations, two key questions are: i) Will exported cases lead to local 49 
outbreaks in new locations? and ii) Which surveillance and control strategies in those new 50 
locations will reduce the risk of local outbreaks?  51 
 52 
Branching process models are used for a range of diseases to assess whether cases that are newly 53 
arrived in a host population will generate a local outbreak driven by sustained local transmission 54 
[5-11]. These models can also be used to predict the effectiveness of potential control 55 
interventions. For example, early in the COVID-19 pandemic, Hellewell et al. [12] used 56 
simulations of a branching process model to predict whether or not new outbreaks would fade out 57 
under different contact tracing strategies. Thompson [13] estimated the probability of local 58 
outbreaks analytically using a branching process model and found that effective isolation of 59 
infectious hosts leads to a substantial reduction in the outbreak risk.  60 
 61 
A factor that can hinder control interventions during any epidemic is the potential for individuals 62 
to transmit a pathogen while not showing symptoms. For COVID-19, the incubation period has 63 
been estimated to last approximately five or six days on average [14, 15], and presymptomatic 64 
transmission can occur during that period [16-20]. Additionally, asymptomatic infected individuals 65 
(those who never develop symptoms) are also thought to contribute to transmission [16, 21, 22]. 66 
 67 
Motivated by the need to assess the risk of outbreaks outside China early in the COVID-19 68 
pandemic, we show how the risk that imported cases will lead to local outbreaks can be estimated 69 
using a branching process model. Unlike standard approaches for estimating the probability of a 70 
major epidemic analytically [23-26], nonsymptomatic individuals are included in the model 71 
 4 
explicitly. Using a function that characterises the efficacy of interventions for different 72 
surveillance efforts (denoted 𝑓(𝜌, 𝛿) in the model), we explore the effects of interventions that aim 73 
to reduce this risk. Under the assumption that detected infected hosts are isolated effectively, we 74 
consider whether it is most effective to dedicate resources to enhancing surveillance targeting 75 
symptomatic individuals, to instead focus on increasing surveillance for nonsymptomatic 76 
individuals, or to use a combination of these approaches.  77 
 78 
We show that, when surveillance resources are limited, the maximum reduction in the outbreak 79 
risk almost always corresponds to a mixed strategy involving enhanced surveillance of both 80 
symptomatic and nonsymptomatic hosts. This remains the case even if the surveillance effort 81 
required to find nonsymptomatic infected individuals is significantly larger than the effort required 82 
to find symptomatic individuals. This highlights the benefits of not only seeking to find and isolate 83 
symptomatic hosts, but also dedicating resources to detecting nonsymptomatic cases during 84 
infectious disease epidemics. 85 
 86 
2. Methods 87 
2.1 Model 88 
We consider a branching process model in which infectious individuals are classified as 89 
asymptomatic (𝐴), presymptomatic (𝐼1) or symptomatic (𝐼2). Hosts in any of these classes may 90 
generate new infections. The parameter 𝜉 represents the proportion of new infections that are 91 
asymptomatic, so that a new infection either involves increasing 𝐴 by one (with probability 𝜉) or 92 
increasing 𝐼1 by one (with probability 1 − 𝜉). 93 
 94 
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Presymptomatic hosts may go on to develop symptoms (transition from 𝐼1 to 𝐼2) or be detected and 95 
isolated (so that 𝐼1 decreases by one). Symptomatic individuals (𝐼2) can be isolated (so that 𝐼2 96 
decreases by one) or be removed due to recovery or death (so that again 𝐼2 decreases by one). 97 
Similarly, asymptomatic hosts may be detected and isolated, or recover (so that 𝐴 decreases by 98 
one in either case). 99 
 100 
A schematic showing the different possible events in the model is shown in Fig 1A. The analogous 101 
compartmental differential equation model to the branching process model that we consider is 102 
given by 103 
d𝐴
d𝑡
= 𝜉(𝜂𝛽𝐴 + 𝛼𝛽𝐼1 + 𝛽𝐼2) −
𝛾
1 − f(𝜌1, 𝛿)
𝐴 − 𝜈𝐴, 104 
d𝐼1
d𝑡
= (1 − 𝜉)(𝜂𝛽𝐴 + 𝛼𝛽𝐼1 + 𝛽𝐼2) −
𝛾
1 − f(𝜌1, 𝛿)





1 − f(𝜌2, 𝛿)
𝐼2 − 𝜇𝐼2. 106 
The parameters of the model, and the form of the function 𝑓(𝜌, 𝛿) that describes how the expected 107 




Fig 1. The branching process model used in our analyses. A. Schematic showing the different event 111 
types in the branching process model. The parameters of the model are described in the text and in Table 112 
1. B. The relationship between the surveillance intensification effort (𝜌) and the proportional reduction in 113 
the expected time to isolation (𝑓(𝜌, 𝛿)), shown for different values of the parameter 𝛿 (solid lines). The 114 
parameter 𝛿 ∈ (0,1) represents the upper bound of 𝑓(𝜌, 𝛿) (dotted lines). This general functional 115 
relationship between surveillance effort and isolation effectiveness is assumed to hold for surveillance of 116 
both nonsymptomatic and symptomatic individuals, although nonsymptomatic hosts are more challenging 117 
to detect than symptomatic hosts ( < 1). 118 
 119 
In our model, the parameter 𝛽 and its scaled counterparts 𝛼𝛽 and 𝜂𝛽 represent the rates at which 120 
symptomatic, presymptomatic and asymptomatic hosts generate new infections, respectively. 121 
Since we are modelling the beginning of a potential local outbreak, we assume that the size of the 122 
susceptible population remains approximately constant and do not track the depletion of this 123 
population. The parameter 𝜆 governs the rate at which presymptomatic individuals develop 124 
symptoms, so that the expected duration of the presymptomatic period is 1/𝜆 days in the absence 125 
of interventions. Similarly, without interventions, the expected durations of the symptomatic and 126 
asymptomatic infectious periods are 1/𝜇 days and 1/𝜈 days, respectively.  127 
 128 
The baseline rate at which symptomatic individuals are detected and isolated is determined by the 129 
parameter 𝛾. Assuming that nonsymptomatic individuals are more difficult to detect than 130 
symptomatic individuals, we take the analogous quantity for nonsymptomatic hosts to be 𝛾, 131 
where the scaling factor < 1 reflects the fact that interventions targeting nonsymptomatic hosts 132 
are likely to be less effective for the same surveillance effort. We assume that the sensitivity of 133 
surveillance is identical for presymptomatic and asymptomatic individuals, and therefore use the 134 
same isolation rate for both of these groups. 135 
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 136 
The parameters 𝜌1 and 𝜌2 represent the surveillance intensification effort targeted at 137 
nonsymptomatic and symptomatic hosts, respectively. The function f(𝜌, 𝛿) =
𝛿𝜌
1+𝜌
 governs the 138 
proportional reduction in the expected time to isolation for a given surveillance effort, 𝜌 (for a 139 
similar approach in which the proportion of infectious cases prevented is assumed to be a function 140 
of control effort, see Matthews et al. [27]). The functional form of f(𝜌, 𝛿) is chosen for three main 141 
reasons. First,  it generates a reduced expected time to isolation when the surveillance effort 142 
increases. Second, since the proportional reduction in the expected time to isolation is bounded 143 
above by the parameter 𝛿 ∈ (0,1), the isolation rate saturates and cannot increase indefinitely. 144 
Third, the gradient 
𝜕𝑓
𝜕𝜌
 decreases with the surveillance effort 𝜌, meaning that an increase in the 145 
surveillance effort has a greater impact at low surveillance efforts compared to when this effort is 146 
already large [27]. The function f(𝜌, 𝛿) is shown in Fig 1B for different values of the parameter 𝛿. 147 
 148 
2.2 Reproduction number 149 
The basic reproduction number, 𝑅0, represents the expected number of secondary infections 150 
generated by a single infected individual introduced at the start of their infection into a fully 151 














This expression is the sum of the expected number of transmissions from a host who begins in the 154 
asymptomatic class and from a host who begins in the presymptomatic infectious class, weighted 155 
by the respective probabilities 𝜉 and 1 − 𝜉 that determine the chance that the host experiences a 156 
fully asymptomatic course of infection. The expected number of transmissions from a host who 157 
begins in the presymptomatic infectious class comprises transmissions occurring during the 158 
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incubation period and transmissions occurring during the symptomatic period, accounting for the 159 
possibility that the host is isolated prior to developing symptoms. 160 
 161 
The proportion of infections arising from presymptomatic hosts in the absence of intensified 162 
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 167 
2.3 Baseline values of model parameters 168 
Since this research was motivated by the need to estimate outbreak risks outside China in the 169 
initial stages of the COVID-19 pandemic, we used a baseline set of parameter values in our 170 
analyses that was informed by studies conducted during this pandemic (Table 1). Where possible, 171 
these parameter values were obtained from existing literature. However, we also performed 172 
sensitivity analyses to determine how our results varied when the parameter values were changed 173 
(see Supplementary Text S3 and Supplementary Figs S3-12). In Table 1, and throughout, rounded 174 
values are given to three significant figures. 175 
 176 
Table 1. Parameters of the model and the values used in the baseline version of our analysis. 177 
Parameter Meaning Baseline value Justification 
𝑅0 
Expected number of secondary 
infections caused by a single 
𝑅0 = 3 
Within estimated range for SARS-CoV-2 
[28-31] 
 9 
infected individual (when 𝜌1 =
𝜌2 = 0) 
𝜉 
Proportion of infections  that are 
asymptomatic 
𝜉 = 0.2 [32-34] 
𝛽 
Rate at which symptomatic 
individuals generate new 
infections 




Chosen so that 𝑅0 = 3 
𝛼 
Relative infectiousness of 
presymptomatic individuals 
compared to symptomatic 
individuals 
𝛼 = 2.78  
 
Chosen so that 48.9% of transmissions 
arise from presymptomatic hosts (i.e. 
𝐾𝑝 = 0.489) [16] 
𝜂 
Relative infectiousness of 
asymptomatic individuals 
compared to symptomatic 
individuals 
𝜂 = 0.519 
 
Chosen so that 10.6% of transmissions 
arise from asymptomatic hosts (i.e. 𝐾𝑎 =
0.106) [16] 
𝛾 
Isolation rate of symptomatic 
individuals without intensified 
surveillance 




Chosen so that 
1
𝛾+𝜇
= 4.6 days [35] 
 
Relative isolation rate of 
nonsymptomatic individuals 
without intensified surveillance 
(compared to symptomatic 
individuals) 
= 0.1 
Assumed; chosen within the range  
∈ (0,1) (for different values, see Fig 
S7) 
𝜆 
Rate at which presymptomatic 
individuals develop symptoms 
𝜆 = 0.5 days−1 [20] 
𝜇 
Recovery rate of symptomatic 
individuals 
𝜇
= 1/8 days−1 
[36-38] 
𝜈 
Recovery rate of asymptomatic 
individuals 
𝜈 = 0.1 days−1 
Chosen so that, in the absence of 
interventions, the expected duration of 












Upper bound on the fractional 
reduction in the time to isolation  
𝛿 = 0.8 
Assumed; chosen within the natural 
range 𝛿 ∈ (0,1) (for different values, see 
Fig S11) 
𝜌1 
Surveillance intensification effort 
targeted at nonsymptomatic hosts 
𝜌1 allowed to 
vary in the 
range [0,20] 
N/A – range of values explored 
𝜌2 
Surveillance intensification effort 
targeted at symptomatic hosts 
𝜌2 allowed to 
vary in the 
range [0,20] 
N/A – range of values explored 
 178 
The value of the parameter governing the baseline rate at which symptomatic individuals are 179 
isolated, 𝛾, was chosen to match empirical observations which indicate that individuals who seek 180 
 10 
medical care prior to recovery or death do so around four to six days after symptom onset [35]. 181 
Specifically, we assumed that the period of time to the first medical visit could be used a proxy for 182 
the time to isolation, and chose 𝛾 so that the expected time period to isolation conditional on 183 
isolation occurring during the symptomatic period was given by 
1
𝛾+𝜇
= 4.6 days [35]. This is 184 




 days (see Methods).  186 
 187 
2.4 Probability of a local outbreak 188 
For stochastic simulations of compartmental epidemiological models starting from a small number 189 
of hosts infected initially, there are generally two qualitatively different types of behaviour. The 190 
pathogen may fade out rapidly, or case numbers may begin to increase exponentially (only starting 191 
to fade out once the number of susceptible individuals has been sufficiently depleted, unless public 192 
health measures are introduced to reduce transmission). Consequently, running many simulations 193 
of those types of model with 𝑅0 larger than but not close to one, the epidemic size is distributed 194 
bimodally, with the total number of individuals ever infected falling into one of two distinct ranges 195 
(for a simple example, see Supplementary Fig S1A; see also [39-41]). In that scenario, a natural 196 
definition for the probability of a local outbreak is therefore the proportion of outbreak simulations 197 
for which the total number of infected individuals falls into the higher of these two ranges.  198 
 199 
Here, since we are considering the initial phase of potential local outbreaks, we instead considered 200 
a branching process model in which depletion of susceptibles was not accounted for. If simulations 201 
of branching process models are run, then in each simulation the pathogen either fades out with 202 
few infections or case numbers generally increase indefinitely. The probability of a local outbreak 203 
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starting from a small number of infected hosts then corresponds to the proportion of simulations in 204 
which the pathogen does not fade out quickly and case numbers increase indefinitely instead. This 205 
again provides a natural definition of a local outbreak, since simulations can be partitioned into 206 
two distinct sets (for an example in which simulations of a simple branching process model are 207 
used to calculate the probability of a local outbreak, see Supplementary Fig S1B). 208 
 209 
As an alternative to repeated simulation, we instead use our branching process model (Fig 1A) to 210 
perform analytic calculations of the probability that a single imported infectious host initiates a 211 
local outbreak. To do this, we denote the probability of a local outbreak not occurring, starting 212 
from 𝑖 presymptomatic hosts, 𝑗 symptomatic hosts, and 𝑘 asymptomatic hosts,  by 𝑞𝑖,𝑗,𝑘. Starting 213 
from one presymptomatic host (so that 𝑖 = 1 and 𝑗 = 𝑘 = 0), there are four possibilities for the 214 
next event. That host could:  215 





);  216 





);  217 





), or;  218 






).  219 
These probabilities are obtained by considering the rates at which different possible events occur 220 
in the branching process model. Presymptomatic hosts generate new infections at rate 𝛼𝛽, and 221 
these new infections occur in asymptomatic and presymptomatic hosts with probabilities 𝜉 and 222 
1 − 𝜉, respectively. Therefore, starting from a single presymptomatic host, new asymptomatic 223 
infections occur at rate 𝜉𝛼𝛽, whilst new presymptomatic infections occur at rate (1 − 𝜉)𝛼𝛽. 224 
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The overall rate at which events occur is the sum of these individual event rates: 226 
Total event rate = 𝛼𝛽 + 𝜆 +
 𝜖𝛾
1 − 𝑓(𝜌1, 𝛿)
. 227 
For each of the four possible next events (i-iv, above), the probability that event occurs next is the 228 
individual rate at which that event occurs divided by the total event rate, leading to the expressions 229 
given. 230 
 231 
 We use these probabilities to condition on the event that occurs next in the branching process, 232 
following the introduction of a single presymptomatic infectious individual into the population. If 233 





, the probability that a local outbreak subsequently does not occur is 𝑞1,0,1. Applying 235 






















𝑞0,0,0.  237 
 238 
If there are no infectious hosts present in the population (i.e. 𝑖 = 𝑗 = 𝑘 = 0), then a local outbreak 239 
will not occur and so 𝑞0,0,0 = 1. Assuming that transmission chains arising from two infectious 240 
individuals are independent gives 𝑞1,0,1 = 𝑞1,0,0 𝑞0,0,1 and 𝑞2,0,0 = 𝑞1,0,0
2 . Hence, 241 
𝑞1,0,0 = 𝑎𝜉𝑞1,0,0 𝑞0,0,1 + 𝑎(1 − 𝜉)𝑞1,0,0














Similarly, considering the probability of a local outbreak failing to occur starting from a single 245 






















As before, noting that 𝑞0,0,0 = 1 and assuming that different infection lineages are independent 248 
leads to 249 








Finally, considering the probability of a local outbreak failing to occur starting from a single 252 
asymptomatic host gives 253 
𝑞0,0,1 = 𝑑𝜉𝑞0,0,1








Equations (3), (4) and (5) may be combined to give a single quartic equation for 𝑞0,0,1, yielding 257 
four sets of solutions for 𝑞1,0,0, 𝑞0,1,0 and 𝑞0,0,1 (see Supplementary Text S1). It is straightforward 258 
to verify that 𝑞1,0,0 = 𝑞0,1,0 = 𝑞0,0,1 = 1 is always a solution, and further solutions can be found 259 
numerically. The appropriate solution to take is the minimal non-negative real solution 𝑞1,0,0 =260 
𝑞1,0,0
∗ , 𝑞0,1,0 = 𝑞0,1,0
∗ , 𝑞0,0,1 = 𝑞0,0,1
∗  (see Supplementary Text S1). Then, the probability of a local 261 
outbreak occurring beginning from a single presymptomatic host is given by  262 
𝑝1,0,0 = 1 − 𝑞1,0,0
∗ , 263 
with equivalent expressions holding for 𝑝0,1,0 and 𝑝0,0,1 (the probability of a local outbreak 264 
occurring beginning from a single symptomatic host or a single asymptomatic host, respectively). 265 
 266 
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Throughout, we consider the probability 𝑝 of a local outbreak starting from a single 267 
nonsymptomatic host entering the population, accounting for the possibility that the 268 
nonsymptomatic host is either presymptomatic or asymptomatic: 269 
𝑝 = (1 − 𝜉)𝑝1,0,0 + 𝜉𝑝0,0,1. 270 
 271 
3. Results 272 
3.1 Probability of a local outbreak 273 
We considered the effect of 𝑅0 and the duration of the presymptomatic and asymptomatic periods 274 
on the probability of a local outbreak when a nonsymptomatic host enters a new host population 275 
(Fig 2). We examined presymptomatic periods of length 1/𝜆 = 1 day, 1/𝜆 = 2 days and 1/𝜆 = 4 276 
days; in each case, the duration of the asymptomatic period (1/𝜈 days) was adjusted so that the 277 
relative proportion of infections arising from asymptomatic hosts compared to presymptomatic 278 
hosts remained fixed (𝐾𝑎/𝐾𝑝 = 0.218, as in the baseline case). If instead nonsymptomatic 279 
infections are not accounted for, the infectious period follows an exponential distribution and the 280 
probability of a local outbreak is given by 𝑝 = 1 − 1/𝑅0 (red dash-dotted line in Fig 2A). 281 
Including nonsymptomatic infection in the model therefore led to an increased risk of a local 282 




Fig 2. The effect of the duration of the presymptomatic and asymptomatic periods on the probability 286 
of a local outbreak (𝒑), starting from a single nonsymptomatic host. A. The probability of a local 287 
outbreak as a function of the basic reproduction number 𝑅0, for presymptomatic periods of lengths 1/𝜆 = 1 288 
day (purple), 1/𝜆 = 2 days (blue) and 1/𝜆 = 4 days (green) in the absence of enhanced surveillance (𝜌1 =289 
𝜌2 = 0). In each case, the duration of the asymptomatic period (1/𝜈) is adjusted so that the relative 290 
proportion of infections arising from asymptomatic hosts compared to presymptomatic hosts remains 291 
constant (𝐾𝑎/𝐾𝑝 = 0.218, as in the baseline case). The red dash-dotted line indicates the probability of a 292 
local outbreak in the absence of nonsymptomatic transmission. The vertical grey dotted line indicates 𝑅0 =293 
3, the baseline value used throughout. B. The probability of a local outbreak as a function of the surveillance 294 
intensification efforts 𝜌1 and 𝜌2, for 1/𝜆 = 1 day. C. The analogous figure to B but with 1/𝜆 = 2 days. D. 295 
The analogous figure to B but with 1/𝜆 = 4 days. Red dotted lines indicate contours of constant local 296 
outbreak probability (i.e. lines on which the probability of a local outbreak takes the values shown). The 297 
 16 
value of 𝛽 is varied in each panel to fix 𝑅0 = 3. All other parameter values are held fixed at the values in 298 
Table 1 (except where stated). 299 
 300 
We then considered the dependence of the probability of a local outbreak on the intensity of 301 
surveillance targeting nonsymptomatic and symptomatic hosts (Fig 2B-D). The maximum value of 302 
the surveillance intensification effort that we considered (given by 𝜌1 or 𝜌2 values of 20) 303 









The length of the presymptomatic and asymptomatic periods significantly affected the dependence 307 
of the probability of a local outbreak on the level of surveillance targeted at nonsymptomatic and 308 
symptomatic hosts. In Fig 2B, in which the duration of the presymptomatic period was 1 day, 309 
increasing surveillance targeted at nonsymptomatic hosts (𝜌1) had a limited effect on the 310 
probability of a local outbreak, while increasing surveillance targeted at symptomatic hosts (𝜌2) 311 
had a more significant effect. For example, increasing the surveillance effort targeted at 312 
nonsymptomatic hosts to 𝜌1 = 5 (a 67% reduction in the time to isolation) only reduced the 313 
probability of a local outbreak from 0.730 to 0.716, whereas the equivalent effort targeted at 314 
symptomatic hosts (𝜌2 = 5) reduced the probability to 0.630. As shown in Figs 3C and D, 315 
however, when the presymptomatic and asymptomatic periods were longer, the benefit of directing 316 
surveillance resources towards detecting nonsymptomatic individuals increased. This was because 317 
longer presymptomatic and asymptomatic periods increased the proportion of infections generated 318 
by nonsymptomatic individuals (𝐾𝑝 + 𝐾𝑎, see equations (1) and (2)); a presymptomatic period of 1 319 




3.2 Optimising surveillance enhancement 323 
We next considered in more detail the impact of surveillance targeted at nonsymptomatic hosts 324 
(𝜌1) relative to the impact of surveillance targeted at symptomatic hosts (𝜌2). For our baseline 325 
parameter values, we considered the probability of a local outbreak starting from a single imported 326 
nonsymptomatic individual for a range of values of 𝜌1 and 𝜌2. We calculated the steepest descent 327 
contours (white lines in Fig 3A) numerically using a gradient maximisation approach, in which at 328 
each point the contour direction was determined by minimising the local outbreak probability over 329 
a fixed search radius (see Supplementary  Text S2 and Supplementary Fig S2). These contours 330 
indicate how 𝜌1 and 𝜌2 should be altered to maximise the reduction in the probability of a local 331 
outbreak. In this case, enhancing surveillance targeting both symptomatic and nonsymptomatic 332 




Fig 3. Optimal surveillance strategies to reduce the probability of a local outbreak (𝒑) starting from a 336 
single nonsymptomatic host. A. The local outbreak probability for different values of 𝜌1 and 𝜌2, with the 337 
steepest descent contours overlaid (white lines). For the maximum reduction in the probability of a local 338 
outbreak at each point, surveillance must be enhanced for both nonsymptomatic and symptomatic 339 
individuals, with different levels of prioritisation depending on the current values of 𝜌1 and 𝜌2. B. Values of 340 
𝜌1 and 𝜌2 for which increasing surveillance for nonsymptomatic hosts (i.e. increasing 𝜌1) is more effective 341 
at reducing the local outbreak probability than increasing surveillance for symptomatic hosts (i.e. increasing 342 
𝜌2) (green region) and vice versa (blue region). The white line represents the steepest descent contour 343 
starting from 𝜌1 = 𝜌2 = 0, under the constraint that surveillance can only be enhanced for either 344 
symptomatic or nonsymptomatic hosts at any time. The diagonal section of the steepest descent contour is 345 
made up of small horizontal and vertical sections. C. Strategies for minimising the local outbreak probability 346 
for a given fixed total surveillance effort (𝜌1 + 𝜌2 = 𝐶). Red dotted lines indicate contours on which 𝜌1 +347 
𝜌2 is constant (i.e. lines on which 𝜌1 + 𝜌2 takes the values shown); red circles indicate the points along these 348 
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contours at which the local outbreak probability is minimised. The white line indicates the optimal 349 
surveillance enhancement strategy if the maximum possible surveillance level (i.e. the maximum value of 350 
𝜌1 + 𝜌2 = 𝐶) is increased. D. Strategies for minimising the surveillance effort required to achieve a pre-351 
specific risk level (an “acceptable” local outbreak probability). Red dotted lines indicate contours of 352 
constant local outbreak probability (i.e. lines on which the probability of a local outbreak takes the values 353 
shown); red circles indicate the points along these contours at which the total surveillance effort 𝜌1 + 𝜌2 is 354 
minimised. The white line indicates the optimal strategy to follow if the pre-specified risk level is increased 355 
or reduced. 356 
 357 
We then considered a scenario in which, at any time, it is only possible to direct resources towards 358 
enhancing surveillance of either nonsymptomatic individuals or symptomatic individuals (e.g. 359 
antigen testing of nonsymptomatic contacts of known infectious individuals, or screening for 360 
symptomatic individuals at public events). In Fig 3B, the blue region represents values of 𝜌1 and 361 
𝜌2 for which enhancing surveillance targeting symptomatic hosts (i.e. increasing 𝜌2) leads to a 362 
larger reduction in the local outbreak probability than enhancing surveillance targeting 363 
nonsymptomatic hosts (i.e. increasing 𝜌1). In contrast, in the green region, enhancing surveillance 364 
of nonsymptomatic individuals is more effective than enhancing surveillance of symptomatic 365 
individuals. The white line represents the steepest descent contour starting from 𝜌1 = 𝜌2 = 0, 366 
under the constraint that surveillance can only be enhanced for symptomatic or nonsymptomatic 367 
hosts at any time. 368 
 369 
Practical deployment of surveillance is often subject to logistical constraints, and policy-makers 370 
may wish to design surveillance strategies to achieve a specific objective – for example, to 371 
maximise the effectiveness of limited resources or to minimise the cost of achieving a desired 372 
outcome. We therefore also considered the following two examples of such objectives. 373 
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 374 
Objective 1: Minimise the probability of a local outbreak for a fixed total surveillance effort. 375 
First, we considered the question: given a fixed maximum surveillance effort (𝜌1 + 𝜌2 = 𝐶), how 376 
should surveillance be targeted at nonsymptomatic and symptomatic hosts? This involves setting 377 
the values of 𝜌1 and 𝜌2 to minimise the local outbreak probability. The optimal strategies in this 378 
case are shown in Fig 3C. The red dotted lines represent contours along which the total 379 
surveillance effort 𝜌1 + 𝜌2 is held constant (i.e. different values of 𝐶). On each contour, the red 380 
circle indicates the point at which the local outbreak probability is minimised.  381 
 382 
If surveillance resources are increased (i.e. 𝐶 increases), a further question is how surveillance 383 
should then be increased. In Fig 3C, the white line represents the contour of steepest descent, 384 
under the constraint that the total change in surveillance effort (𝜌1 + 𝜌2) is held constant at each 385 
step (rather than a constant search radius, as in Fig 3A – for more details, see  Supplementary Text 386 
S2 and Supplementary Fig S2). This contour coincides exactly with that shown in Fig 3B. 387 
 388 
These results indicate that, if surveillance resources are such that 𝐶 is greater than 2.8 389 
(corresponding to a 59% reduction in time to isolation of symptomatic hosts), the optimal 390 
surveillance strategy involves both enhanced surveillance of symptomatic individuals and 391 
nonsymptomatic individuals (the red dots correspond to strictly positive values of both 𝜌1 and 𝜌2, 392 
unless 𝐶 is less than 2.8). 393 
 394 
Objective 2: Minimise the total surveillance effort to achieve a pre-specified reduction in the 395 
probability of a local outbreak. Second, we considered the question: given a pre-specified 396 
acceptable risk level (i.e. probability of a local outbreak), how should the surveillance level 397 
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targeted at nonsymptomatic and symptomatic hosts be chosen? This involves choosing 𝜌1 and 𝜌2 398 
to minimise 𝜌1 + 𝜌2 along a given contour corresponding to a fixed local outbreak probability (red 399 
dotted lines in Fig 3D). On each contour, the red circle indicates the point along that contour at 400 
which the total surveillance effort 𝜌1 + 𝜌2 is minimised. These optimal points also lie exactly 401 
along the line on which enhancing surveillance targeted at symptomatic hosts is equally effective 402 
compared to enhancing surveillance targeted at nonsymptomatic hosts. 403 
 404 
As long as the target local outbreak probability is less than 0.69, optimal surveillance  involves 405 
enhanced surveillance of nonsymptomatic individuals as well as symptomatic individuals. For 406 
example, in order to reduce the local outbreak probability to 0.6, the optimal approach  is to deploy 407 
resources such that 𝜌1 = 12.4 (a 74% reduction in time to isolation of nonsymptomatic 408 
individuals) and 𝜌2 = 18.0 (a 76% reduction in time to isolation of symptomatic individuals).  409 
 410 
Plots analogous to Fig 3D in which the parameters were varied from their baseline values are 411 
shown in Supplementary Figs S3-12. In each case that we considered, our main finding was 412 
unchanged. There always exists a threshold local outbreak probability such that, if the target local 413 
outbreak probability is below this threshold, the optimal strategy for further reduction in the local 414 
outbreak probability involves enhancing surveillance targeting both nonsymptomatic and 415 
symptomatic individuals. 416 
 417 
4. Discussion 418 
A key component of infectious disease epidemic management is inferring the risk of outbreaks in 419 
different locations [5-8, 11, 41, 42]. Surveillance and control strategies can be introduced to reduce 420 
the risk that imported cases will lead to local outbreaks [12, 13, 43-46]. However, for a range of 421 
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pathogens, public health measures are hindered by nonsymptomatic infectious hosts who can 422 
transmit the pathogen yet are challenging to detect [16, 42, 44, 47-49]. 423 
 424 
Here, we showed how the probability of a local outbreak can be estimated using a branching 425 
process model that accounts for transmission from nonsymptomatic infected individuals (Fig 1). 426 
The model can be used to assess the local outbreak probability for different surveillance strategies 427 
that target nonsymptomatic or symptomatic hosts (Fig 2). Previous studies have shown that 428 
detection of nonsymptomatic infections can be a key component of epidemic forecasting [42] and 429 
containment [44], and have demonstrated the benefits of identifying and isolating infectious 430 
nonsymptomatic hosts to reduce transmission [16, 17]. We focused instead on investigating how 431 
surveillance should be targeted at nonsymptomatic or symptomatic hosts in order to reduce the 432 
probability that cases imported to new locations will trigger a local outbreak (Fig 3A,B). We also 433 
showed how the optimal surveillance level targeting these two groups can be assessed when 434 
surveillance resources are limited and policy-makers have specific objectives (Fig 3C,D). In each 435 
case, our main conclusion was that surveillance for nonsymptomatic infected hosts (𝜌1 > 0) can 436 
be an important component of reducing the local outbreak risk during epidemics. This result has 437 
broad implications, and our analysis could be extended to assess the potential for containing 438 
outbreaks at their source using a range of specific interventions targeting symptomatic and 439 
nonsymptomatic hosts. 440 
 441 
Our goal here was to use the simplest possible model to explore the effects of surveillance of 442 
nonsymptomatic and symptomatic individuals on the risk of local outbreaks. However, this model 443 
is not without its limitations. One area of uncertainty is the precise values of the parameters 444 
governing pathogen transmission and control. In this article, we chose a baseline set of parameter 445 
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values that is consistent with the findings of studies conducted during the COVID-19 pandemic, 446 
although constructing a detailed transmission model for this pandemic was not our main focus. For 447 
example, we set the relative rates at which presymptomatic and asymptomatic individuals generate 448 
new infections compared to symptomatic individuals so that 48.9% of transmissions arise from 449 
presymptomatic infectors, and 10.6% arise from asymptomatic infectors [16]. While this is in line 450 
with reported estimates [50, 51], there is substantial variation between studies. Similarly, the 451 
proportion of individuals who experience a fully asymptomatic course of infection (denoted by 𝜉 452 
in our model) is subject to a considerable degree of uncertainty. Here, we chose 𝜉 = 0.2 as the 453 
baseline value [32-34] but estimates in the literature range from 0.04 to over 0.8 [33, 52-54]. We 454 
therefore also conducted sensitivity analyses in which we explored a range of different values of 455 
model parameters (Supplementary Text S3 and Supplementary Figs S3-12). In each case that we 456 
considered, our main conclusion was unchanged: surveillance of nonsymptomatic individuals can 457 
contribute to reducing the risk of local outbreaks. This result is expected to hold for epidemics of 458 
any pathogen for which nonsymptomatic individuals contribute significantly to transmission. 459 
 460 
For our modelling approach to be used to make precise quantitative predictions during epidemics, 461 
it would be necessary to update the model to include the range of different specific surveillance 462 
and control interventions that are in place. For example, detection of nonsymptomatic infected 463 
individuals is facilitated by contact tracing and antigen testing, which are carried out routinely 464 
during epidemics and can be included in models explicitly [12, 44, 55, 56]. Reductions in contacts 465 
due to social distancing strategies and school or workplace closures could also be accounted for 466 
[57, 58], although such interventions are often introduced after a local outbreak has begun rather 467 
than in the initial phase of a potential local outbreak as considered here. We modelled the level of 468 
surveillance targeted at nonsymptomatic and symptomatic hosts in a simple way, using a function 469 
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describing the relationship between surveillance effort and effectiveness (Fig 1B). We assumed 470 
that this general functional relationship could be applied to interventions targeting both 471 
symptomatic and nonsymptomatic hosts, accounting for logistical differences in the ease of 472 
targeting either group by scaling the effectiveness of surveillance for nonsymptomatic hosts using 473 
the parameter  (results are shown for different values of  in Supplementary Fig S8). In principle, 474 
it would be possible to include entirely different functional forms describing the relationship 475 
between surveillance effort and effectiveness for strategies targeting symptomatic and 476 
nonsymptomatic individuals, and these could be tailored to the effects of particular interventions. 477 
If different public health measures are included in the model explicitly, then it would be possible 478 
to increase the accuracy of assessments of the relative public health benefits of specific 479 
interventions that only target symptomatic individuals (e.g. screening for passengers with 480 
heightened temperatures at airports [59, 60]) compared to interventions that also target 481 
nonsymptomatic hosts (e.g. travel bans or quarantine of all inbound passengers [61, 62]). Of 482 
course, this would require data from which the relative effectiveness of different measures could 483 
be inferred. 484 
 485 
The underlying transmission model could also be extended to include additional realism in several 486 
ways. Transmission dynamics are influenced by marked heterogeneities in the patterns of contacts 487 
between individuals in different age groups [63, 64], and, for COVID-19, susceptibility to 488 
infection, the likelihood of developing symptoms, and the average severity of those symptoms 489 
increase with age [65, 66]. Age-dependent variation in the proportion of asymptomatic cases in 490 
particular implies that the optimal balance of surveillance between symptomatic and 491 
nonsymptomatic hosts may differ between age groups. An age-structured version of the model 492 
presented here is a focus of our ongoing research. Similarly, for a range of infectious diseases, the 493 
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distribution characterising the number of secondary infections generated by each infected host (the 494 
offspring distribution) exhibits a high degree of overdispersion [67-70]. For a fixed value of 𝑅0, a 495 
higher degree of overdispersion increases the likelihood that initial cases will fade out without 496 
leading to a local outbreak [71, 72], and suggests that greater reductions in local outbreak risks 497 
could theoretically be achieved for the same surveillance effort, if potential superspreaders or 498 
superspreading events can be identified and targeted. 499 
 500 
Despite the necessary simplifications, we have shown how the risk of local outbreaks can be 501 
estimated during epidemics using a branching process model that includes nonsymptomatic 502 
infectious hosts explicitly. Determining the extent to which nonsymptomatic individuals contribute 503 
to transmission is essential early in emerging epidemics of a novel pathogen. As we have shown, if 504 
transmissions occur from nonsymptomatic infectors, dedicating surveillance resources towards 505 
finding nonsymptomatic cases can be an important component of public health measures that aim 506 
to prevent local outbreaks.  507 
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Supplementary Text 751 
 752 
Text S1. Probability of a local outbreak 753 
In the Methods section of the main text, we outlined an approach for deriving the probability of a local outbreak 754 
starting from a single infectious host in either the presymptomatic, symptomatic or asymptomatic classes. Here, 755 
we provide more details about that derivation. The probability of a local outbreak not occurring, starting from 𝑖 756 
presymptomatic hosts, 𝑗 symptomatic hosts and 𝑘 asymptomatic hosts, is denoted by 𝑞𝑖,𝑗,𝑘. If we consider the 757 
temporal evolution of (𝑖, 𝑗, 𝑘) to be a Markov process on the state space 𝑀 = ℤ≥0 × ℤ≥0 × ℤ≥0, then 𝑞𝑖,𝑗,𝑘 is the 758 
hitting probability of the state (0,0,0) starting from the state (𝑖, 𝑗, 𝑘). The vector of hitting probabilities 𝑞∗ =759 
{𝑞𝑖,𝑗,𝑘
∗  | (𝑖, 𝑗, 𝑘) ∈ 𝑀} is therefore the minimal non-negative (real) solution to the following system of equations: 760 
𝑞0,0,0 = 1, 761 
𝑞𝑖,𝑗,𝑘 = ∑ 𝑝(𝑖,𝑗,𝑘),(𝑙,𝑚,𝑛) 𝑞𝑙,𝑚,𝑛(𝑙,𝑚,𝑛)∈𝑀  for (𝑖, 𝑗, 𝑘) ≠ (0,0,0), 762 
where 𝑝(𝑖,𝑗,𝑘),(𝑙,𝑚,𝑛) is the transition probability from state (𝑖, 𝑗, 𝑘) to state (𝑙, 𝑚, 𝑛) [73]. 763 
 Here, minimality means that if ?̂? = {?̂?𝑖,𝑗,𝑘  | (𝑖, 𝑗, 𝑘) ∈ 𝑀} is another non-negative real solution, then 𝑞𝑖,𝑗,𝑘
∗ ≤764 
?̂?𝑖,𝑗,𝑘 for all (𝑖, 𝑗, 𝑘) ∈ 𝑀. 765 
 766 
From this, equations (3), (4) and (5) in the main text are obtained. These equations may be reduced to the 767 




2 + 𝜔1𝑞0,0,1 + 𝜔0 = 0, 769 
where 770 
𝜔4 = 𝑑(𝑎 − 𝑑)(𝑑 − 𝑐)𝜉; 771 
𝜔3 = 𝑐𝑑(𝑎 − 𝑑)(1 − 𝑑)𝜉 − 𝑏𝑑
3(1 − 𝑐)(1 − 𝜉) + (𝑑 − 𝑐)[𝑑 − 𝑎 − 𝑎𝑑𝜉 + 𝑑2(𝑎 − 1 + 𝑏(1 − 𝜉) + 𝜉)]; 772 
𝑤2 = 𝑐(1 − 𝑑)[𝑑 − 𝑎 − 𝑎𝑑𝜉 + 𝑑
2(𝑎 − 1 + 𝑏(1 − 𝜉) + 𝜉)] + (𝑑 − 𝑐)[𝑑(𝑑 − 2𝑎 − 1) + 2𝑎]; 773 
𝜔1 = 𝑐(1 − 𝑑)[𝑑(𝑑 − 2𝑎 − 1) + 2𝑎] − 𝑎(1 − 𝑑)
2(𝑑 − 𝑐); 774 
𝜔0 = −𝑎𝑐(1 − 𝑑)
3. 775 
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The parameters 𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐, 𝑑 and 𝜉 are as defined in the main text. 776 
 777 
This yields four solutions for 𝑞0,0,1 and four corresponding solutions for each of 𝑞1,0,0 and 𝑞0,1,0. One solution is 778 
always given by 𝑞1,0,0 = 𝑞0,1,0 = 𝑞0,0,1 = 1; the other solutions may be found numerically. As described above, 779 
we take the minimal non-negative real solution 𝑞1,0,0 = 𝑞1,0,0
∗ , 𝑞0,1,0 = 𝑞0,1,0
∗ , 𝑞0,0,1 = 𝑞0,0,1
∗ , and observe that the 780 
probability of a local outbreak occurring starting from 𝑖 presymptomatic hosts, 𝑗 symptomatic hosts and 𝑘 781 
asymptomatic hosts is simply 1 − 𝑞𝑖,𝑗,𝑘, giving the result stated in the main text.  782 
 783 
If required, this result can be confirmed for specific model parameter values via repeated stochastic simulation of 784 
the branching process model, starting from 𝑖 presymptomatic hosts, 𝑗 symptomatic hosts and 𝑘 asymptomatic 785 
hosts. As described in the main text, in simulations of branching process models, initial cases typically either 786 
fade out or go on to cause a local outbreak. There is a natural definition of a local outbreak as a simulation in 787 
which a large number of infections occur (see Supplementary Fig S1B). The probability of a local outbreak then 788 
corresponds to the proportion of simulations in which large numbers of infections occur.  789 
 790 
We note here that although this is a natural way to define a local outbreak, alternative definitions exist that may 791 
be more appropriate in particular contexts. This is discussed by Thompson et al. (reference [41] in the main 792 
text), who consider three practically relevant definitions of an outbreak based on different criteria for measuring 793 
severity. 794 
 795 
Text S2. Computation of steepest descent contours 796 
The steepest descent contours shown in Fig 3A of the main text were computed using a gradient maximisation 797 
approach, in which at each point the contour direction was determined by minimising the local outbreak 798 
probability over a fixed search radius (Fig S2 A,B). Starting from 𝜌1, 𝜌2, at each step we considered increasing 799 
𝜌1 by an amount Δ𝜌1 and increasing 𝜌2 by an amount Δ𝜌2 subject to the constraint (Δ𝜌1)
2 + (Δ𝜌2)
2 = 𝑟2, 800 
where 𝑟 is a small pre-specified constant. To achieve this, we scanned over the circular arc Δ𝜌1 =801 
𝑟 cos 𝜃 , Δ𝜌2 = 𝑟 sin 𝜃, for 𝜃 ∈ [0, 𝜋 2⁄ ] (Fig S2 A). In practice, this range was discretised into 33 search 802 
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directions evenly spaced between 0 and 𝜋/2. We then selected the pair of Δ𝜌1, Δ𝜌2 values for which the local 803 
outbreak probability evaluated at 𝜌1 + Δ𝜌1, 𝜌2 + Δ𝜌2 was minimised. The process was then repeated beginning 804 
from 𝜌1𝑛𝑒𝑤 = 𝜌1 + Δ𝜌1, 𝜌2𝑛𝑒𝑤 = 𝜌2 + Δ𝜌2 (Fig S2 B). The white line in Fig 3B, which divides the region in 805 
which increasing 𝜌1 has a greater effect on the local outbreak probability from the region in which increasing 𝜌2 806 
has a greater effect on the local outbreak probability, was computed in an analogous way, with the additional 807 
restriction that we only considered the search directions 𝜃 = 0 and 𝜃 = 𝜋/2 (i.e. intensifying only surveillance 808 
of nonsymptomatic or symptomatic hosts; see Fig S2 C). 809 
 810 
In Fig 3C, the white line represents the contour of steepest descent under the constraint that the total change in 811 
surveillance effort (Δ𝜌1 + Δ𝜌2 = 𝑆) is held constant at each step, rather than fixing the search radius (Δ𝜌1)
2 +812 
(Δ𝜌2)
2 = 𝑟2 as in Fig 3A. Therefore, instead of scanning over a circular arc, at each step we scan along the line 813 
Δ𝜌1 = 𝑠, Δ𝜌2 = 𝑆 − 𝑠, where 𝑐 varies in the range [0, 𝑆] (Fig S2 D). Otherwise, the process is completely 814 
analogous to that described above. 815 
 816 
Text S3. Robustness of results to parameter values used 817 
We conducted supplementary analyses to investigate how our results are affected by varying the parameters 818 
from their baseline values given in Table 1. We performed sensitivity analyses on the values of 𝑅0, 𝜉, 𝐾𝑝, 𝐾𝑎 , 𝛾 +819 
𝜇, 𝜖, 𝜆, 𝜈 and 𝛿. For each of these, we present plots analogous to Fig 3D for six different values of the relevant 820 
parameter (Figs S3-S12). In each case we considered, our qualitative message was unchanged: whenever the 821 
maximum acceptable risk level was below a particular threshold value, the optimal strategy involved 822 
surveillance targeting both nonsymptomatic and symptomatic individuals. 823 
 824 
Text S4. Details on computer code 825 





Supplementary Figures 830 
 831 
Fig S1. Illustrating the definition of the term ‘local outbreak’ with a simple example. A. The total number 832 
of individuals ever infected (final epidemic size) in each of 100,000 simulations of a stochastic SIR (Susceptible-833 
Infected-Removed) model with basic reproduction number 𝑅0 = 2, beginning from a single infectious host each 834 
time. Within each simulation, each event is either an infection event (with probability
𝑅0𝑆
𝑅0𝑆+𝑁




), and simulations are run until the pathogen fades out (𝐼 hits zero). This provides a 836 
natural partitioning between simulations that fade out quickly and those that go on to become local outbreaks. In 837 
50% of simulations, fewer than 20 infections occurred in total (left hand peak); initial cases did not lead to 838 
sustained transmission in the population. In the remaining 50% of simulations (local outbreaks), between 620 839 
and 900 individuals were infected in total each time. The probability of a local outbreak is then defined as the 840 
proportion of simulations for which the final epidemic size lies within this natural upper range, here equal to 0.5. 841 
B. The analogous figure to panel A, but for the branching process version of the SIR model in which depletion of 842 
susceptibles is not accounted for (i.e. 𝑆 = 𝑁 throughout each simulation). In this model, each event is either an 843 
infection event (with probability
𝑅0
𝑅0+1
) or a removal event (with probability 
1
𝑅0+1
), and simulations are run until 844 
either the pathogen fades out (𝐼 hits zero) or 1000 infections have occurred. The rightmost bar corresponds to 845 
simulations in which 1000 infections occurred. There is again a natural partitioning between simulations that 846 
fade out quickly and those that go on to become local outbreaks, with the probability of a local outbreak 847 




Fig S2. Computation of the steepest descent contours shown in the main text. A. To compute the steepest 851 
descent contours shown in Fig 3A of the main text, we increment 𝜌1 and 𝜌2 by scanning over a constant search 852 
radius (Δ𝜌1)
2 + (Δ𝜌2)
2 = 𝑟2 (blue arc), and moving to the point (𝜌1𝑛𝑒𝑤 , 𝜌2𝑛𝑒𝑤) along that arc at which the local 853 
outbreak probability is minimised. B. The process shown in A is repeated to generate the complete contour (red 854 
dashed line). C. The analogous figure to B, in which the search direction is limited to directly to the right (𝜃 =855 
0) or directly upwards (𝜃 = 𝜋/2). This procedure is used to generate the contour in Fig 3B in the main text. D. 856 
The analogous figure to B, in which the total change in surveillance effort (Δ𝜌1 + Δ𝜌2 = 𝑆) is held constant at 857 
each step, rather than the search radius. This procedure is used to generate the contour in Figs 3C and D in the 858 





Fig S3. Varying the basic reproduction number 𝑹𝟎 from its baseline value (𝑹𝟎 = 𝟑). Plots are analogous to 863 
Fig 3D in the main text, showing strategies for minimising the surveillance effort required to achieve a pre-864 
specified risk level (an “acceptable” local outbreak probability). Red dotted lines represent contours along which 865 
the probability of a local outbreak is constant, as labelled; red circles indicate the points along these contours at 866 
which the total surveillance effort 𝜌1 + 𝜌2 is minimised. The white line indicates the optimal strategy to follow if 867 
the pre-specified risk level is reduced. Apart from 𝑅0 and 𝛽 (which is changed in each panel to set the value of 868 
𝑅0), all parameters are held fixed at their baseline values given in Table 1. A. 𝑅0 = 1.5. B. 𝑅0 = 2. C. 𝑅0 = 2.5. 869 
D. 𝑅0 = 3 (baseline). E. 𝑅0 = 3.5. F. 𝑅0 = 4.  870 
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 871 
Fig S4. Varying the proportion of infections from asymptomatic infectors, 𝝃, from its baseline value (𝝃 =872 
𝟎. 𝟐). Plots are analogous to Fig 3D in the main text, showing strategies for minimising the surveillance effort 873 
required to achieve a pre-specified risk level (an “acceptable” local outbreak probability). Red dotted lines 874 
represent contours along which the probability of a local outbreak is constant, as labelled; red circles indicate the 875 
points along these contours at which the total surveillance effort 𝜌1 + 𝜌2 is minimised. The white line indicates 876 
the optimal strategy to follow if the pre-specified risk level is reduced. Apart from 𝜉 and 𝛽 (which is changed in 877 
each panel to set 𝑅0 = 3), all parameters are held fixed at their baseline values given in Table 1. A. 𝜉 = 0. B. 878 
𝜉 = 0.1. C. 𝜉 = 0.2 (baseline). D. 𝜉 = 0.3. E. 𝜉 = 0.4. F. 𝜉 = 0.5.  879 
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 880 
Fig S5. Varying the proportion of infections arising from presymptomatic hosts in the absence of 881 
intensified surveillance (𝑲𝒑, given by expression (1) in the main text) from its baseline value (𝑲𝒑 =882 
𝟎. 𝟒𝟖𝟗). In each case, the proportions of infections arising from asymptomatic and symptomatic hosts are 883 
adjusted so that they remain in the same ratio as in the baseline case. Plots are analogous to Fig 3D in the main 884 
text, showing strategies for minimising the surveillance effort required to achieve a pre-specified risk level (an 885 
“acceptable” local outbreak probability). Red dotted lines represent contours along which the probability of a 886 
local outbreak is constant, as labelled; red circles indicate the points along these contours at which the total 887 
surveillance effort 𝜌1 + 𝜌2 is minimised. The white line indicates the optimal strategy to follow if the pre-888 
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specified risk level is reduced. Apart from 𝐾𝑝 and 𝐾𝑎, as well as 𝛼 and 𝜂 (which are changed in each panel to set 889 
the values of 𝐾𝑝 and 𝐾𝑎), and 𝛽 (which is changed in each panel to set 𝑅0 = 3), all parameters are held fixed at 890 
their baseline values given in Table 1. A. 𝐾𝑝 = 0.2. B. 𝐾𝑝 = 0.3. C. 𝐾𝑝 = 0.4. D. 𝐾𝑝 = 0.5. E. 𝐾𝑝 = 0.6. F. 891 
𝐾𝑝 = 0.7.  892 
 893 
 894 
Fig S6. Varying the proportion of infections arising from asymptomatic hosts in the absence of intensified 895 
surveillance (𝑲𝒂, given by expression (2) in the main text) from its baseline value (𝑲𝒂 = 𝟎. 𝟏𝟎𝟔). In each 896 
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case, the proportions of infections arising from presymptomatic and symptomatic hosts are adjusted so that they 897 
remain in the same ratio as in the baseline case. Plots are analogous to Fig 3D in the main text, showing 898 
strategies for minimising the surveillance effort required to achieve a pre-specified risk level (an “acceptable” 899 
local outbreak probability). Red dotted lines represent contours along which the probability of a local outbreak is 900 
constant, as labelled; red circles indicate the points along these contours at which the total surveillance effort 901 
𝜌1 + 𝜌2 is minimised. The white line indicates the optimal strategy to follow if the pre-specified risk level is 902 
reduced. Apart from 𝐾𝑝 and 𝐾𝑎, as well as 𝛼 and 𝜂 (which are changed in each panel to set the values of 𝐾𝑝 and 903 
𝐾𝑎), and 𝛽 (which is changed in each panel to set 𝑅0 = 3), all parameters are held fixed at their baseline values 904 




Fig S7. Varying the expected time period to isolation conditional on isolation occurring during the 908 
symptomatic period, 𝟏/(𝜸 + 𝝁), from its baseline value (𝟏/(𝜸 + 𝝁) = 𝟒. 𝟔 days). This is achieved by 909 
varying the parameter 𝛾, whilst holding the recovery rate of symptomatic individuals 𝜇 equal to its baseline 910 
value (𝜇 = 1/8 days−1). Plots are analogous to Fig 3D in the main text, showing strategies for minimising the 911 
surveillance effort required to achieve a pre-specified risk level (an “acceptable” local outbreak probability). Red 912 
dotted lines represent contours along which the probability of a local outbreak is constant, as labelled; red circles 913 
indicate the points along these contours at which the total surveillance effort 𝜌1 + 𝜌2 is minimised. The white 914 
line indicates the optimal strategy to follow if the pre-specified risk level is reduced. Apart from 𝛾 and 𝛽 (which 915 
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is changed in each panel to set 𝑅0 = 3), all parameters are held fixed at their baseline values given in Table 1. A. 916 
1/(𝛾 + 𝜇) = 2 days. B. 1/(𝛾 + 𝜇) = 3 days. C. 1/(𝛾 + 𝜇) = 4 days. D. 1/(𝛾 + 𝜇) = 5 days. E. 1/(𝛾 + 𝜇) = 6 917 
days. F. 1/(𝛾 + 𝜇) = 7 days.  918 
 919 
 920 
Fig S8. Varying 𝝐, the relative isolation rate of nonsymptomatic individuals without intensified 921 
surveillance (compared to symptomatic individuals), from its baseline value (𝝐 = 𝟎. 𝟏). Plots are analogous 922 
to Fig 3D in the main text, showing strategies for minimising the surveillance effort required to achieve a pre-923 
specified risk level (an “acceptable” local outbreak probability). Red dotted lines represent contours along which 924 
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the probability of a local outbreak is constant, as labelled; red circles indicate the points along these contours at 925 
which the total surveillance effort 𝜌1 + 𝜌2 is minimised. The white line indicates the optimal strategy to follow if 926 
the pre-specified risk level is reduced. Apart from 𝜖 and 𝛽 (which is changed in each panel to set 𝑅0 = 3), all 927 
parameters are held fixed at their baseline values given in Table 1. A. 𝜖 = 0.01. B. 𝜖 = 0.02. C. 𝜖 = 0.05. D. 928 
𝜖 = 0.1 (baseline). E. 𝜖 = 0.2. F. 𝜖 = 0.3.  929 
 930 
 931 
Fig S9. Varying the duration of the presymptomatic period, 𝟏/𝝀, from its baseline value (1/𝝀 = 𝟎. 𝟓 days). 932 
Plots are analogous to Fig 3D in the main text, showing strategies for minimising the surveillance effort required 933 
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to achieve a pre-specified risk level (an “acceptable” local outbreak probability). Red dotted lines represent 934 
contours along which the probability of a local outbreak is constant, as labelled; red circles indicate the points 935 
along these contours at which the total surveillance effort 𝜌1 + 𝜌2 is minimised. The white line indicates the 936 
optimal strategy to follow if the pre-specified risk level is reduced. Apart from 𝜆 and 𝛽 (which is changed in 937 
each panel to set 𝑅0 = 3), all parameters are held fixed at their baseline values given in Table 1. A. 1/𝜆 = 0.5 938 




Fig S10. Varying the duration of the symptomatic period, 𝟏/𝝁, from its baseline value (𝟏/𝝁 = 𝟖 days). The 942 
parameter 𝛾 is varied simultaneously such that 1/(𝛾 + 𝜇), the expected time period to isolation conditional on 943 
isolation occurring during the symptomatic period, remains at its baseline value (1/(𝛾 + 𝜇) = 4.6 days). Plots 944 
are analogous to Fig 3D in the main text, showing strategies for minimising the surveillance effort required to 945 
achieve a pre-specified risk level (an “acceptable” local outbreak probability). Red dotted lines represent 946 
contours along which the probability of a local outbreak is constant, as labelled; red circles indicate the points 947 
along these contours at which the total surveillance effort 𝜌1 + 𝜌2 is minimised. The white line indicates the 948 
optimal strategy to follow if the pre-specified risk level is reduced. Apart from 𝜇 and 𝛾, and 𝛽 (which is changed 949 
in each panel to set 𝑅0 = 3), all parameters are held fixed at their baseline values given in Table 1. A. 1/𝜇 =950 




Fig S11. Varying 𝟏/𝝂, the duration of the asymptomatic period, from its baseline value (𝟏/𝝂 = 𝟏𝟎 days). 954 
Plots are analogous to Fig 3D in the main text, showing strategies for minimising the surveillance effort required 955 
to achieve a pre-specified risk level (an “acceptable” local outbreak probability). Red dotted lines represent 956 
contours along which the probability of a local outbreak is constant, as labelled; red circles indicate the points 957 
along these contours at which the total surveillance effort 𝜌1 + 𝜌2 is minimised. The white line indicates the 958 
optimal strategy to follow if the pre-specified risk level is reduced. Apart from 𝜈 and 𝛽 (which is changed in 959 
each panel to set 𝑅0 = 3), all parameters are held fixed at their baseline values given in Table 1. A. 1/𝜈 = 7 960 
days. B. 1/𝜈 = 8 days. C. 1/𝜈 = 9 days. D. 1/𝜈 = 10 days (baseline). E. 1/𝜈 = 11 days. F. 1/𝜈 = 12 days.  961 
 52 
 962 
Fig S12. Varying the upper bound on the fractional reduction in the time to isolation (if no other event 963 
occurs), 𝜹, from its baseline value (𝜹 = 𝟎. 𝟖). Plots are analogous to Fig 3D in the main text, showing 964 
strategies for minimising the surveillance effort required to achieve a pre-specified risk level (an “acceptable” 965 
local outbreak probability). Red dotted lines represent contours along which the probability of a local outbreak is 966 
constant, as labelled; red circles indicate the points along these contours at which the total surveillance effort 967 
𝜌1 + 𝜌2 is minimised. The white line indicates the optimal strategy to follow if the pre-specified risk level is 968 
reduced. Apart from 𝛿, all parameters are held fixed at their baseline values given in Table 1. A. 𝛿 = 0.5. B. 𝛿 =969 
0.6. C. 𝛿 = 0.7. D. 𝛿 = 0.8 (baseline). E. 𝛿 = 0.9. F. 𝛿 = 0.95 970 
